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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPE All S 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plai) \ppellee 
v. 
N A 'I 'I IA NIEI ,FR EDER ICK PENN, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No 20030638 CA 
'LYBRIhl Oh APPHLI ANT 
Appellant, Natn . .. v a.«^  uiiouun L^ attorneys, hereby replies to the 
*f of the A ppr 111 T * - ai gu 11 ici i l:s 





 >a1 points and clarifications. Any argument not specifically addressed herein is not 
\* ttned, but has been bneled in the initial Uriel oi Appellant 
AJiiaJMENT 
I. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE PLAINLY ERRONEOUS AND 
SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED PENN. 
A ' I i. .1 Counsel Did Not "Invite Error." 
I In < h n i T i i i i i n i f s s o l i n p i t i i n i l M I llln iiiiiiii , iiiiiii . t i i i< '« • » ^""- r , ill),ill ill! ill i n i i n s e l 
Mr. Greg Skordas, "invited error." See Brief of Appellee at 16-19. Based on this claim, 
!B> letter dateu * e' - »t, HK ^^m: ,uc^ as
 SUppiemental authority State 
v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 I 1 ; u, a Jan clarities that with regard to jury instructions, 
"invited error" includes situate nere counsel has "affirmatively endorsed an instruc-
tion,," fails to o'bject w hen specifically questioned b\ the court, has himself submitted the 
insti t iction at issue,, oi has told the court that the proposed instnictions have been read and 
there are no objections. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 I IT 16 at % 10- 11 None of these 
situations occurred in this case. 
the State asserts that this Court must bar all argument made against the instructions. The 
State's argument is misguided, however, as trial counsel did object to the instructions 
now at issue, and even if the objection could have been made clearer, it simply cannot be 
said that Mr. Skordas invited error. 
This Court must understand the context as to how the jury instruction conferences 
were held. On the second day of trial after hearing evidence, the jury was excused and 
told to return at 8 o'clock the next morning (R. 507 at 144). The trial court noted that it 
was still attempting to prepare the written instructions it would give the following day (Id. 
at 141). After the jury was excused, brief discussion took place concerning the 
instructions-first regarding the drug-free zone enhancement, then the entrapment and 
possession issues (Id. at 144-147). 
Next, a discussion took place from which the State relies in suggesting invited 
error- discussion regarding how to instruct a jury as to a physician's illegal possession of 
a controlled substance (Id. at 147). The trial court proceeded to read to counsel what it 
had "worked out" so far (Id. at 148). Without providing a written copy of the 
instruction, the trial court queried, "does that sound about right," to which both counsel 
indicated they "thought so" (Id). The court indicated that it would proceed to type up the 
instructions and that counsel could pick up drafts later that afternoon to look them over 
(Id. at 149). Mr. Skordas then asked what time the court wanted counsel to arrive in 
the morning in order to pose objections (Id.). Thereafter, a time was set (Id). As such, 
despite the characterization of the State, an "I think so" followed by a request for a formal 
2 
lime to make objections should not be considered an "affirmative endorsement" i 
instruction which had yet to be niian/.cu ui iuh> con^idned. 
The * e 
r^posed instructions (R. 508 at J;. Mi. Skordas staled - vs. ana indicated he >* . 
1
 ' lions (Id.) Because the instructions were not numbered a: the time it is imperative 
. * .. '-uw.v.u. . .^ iiwiib side \>\ 2>ivk Miii-m uy instructions given Mr. 
meperidine are controlled substances. . ."" (R. 508 at 3-4). I o this instruction, Mr. Skordas 
requested a short addition which was added. See Reply Brief; Addenda A (Instruction No. 
!!. I \ I r Skordas then makes an objection to the "very next page" in which he 
i equesls that the trial coml* strike! the last, sentence "I 
which Mr. Skordas now refers is Instruction No. 6, and Mr. Skordas explicitly 
requests that the trial court strike the last line (which states that a physician who fails 
(in coinpl; iVilh record-keeping requirements possesses substances illegally), There is 
ii it i nt to link up the "illegal language in the elements instruction" to something that 
i oi illustrative purposes, a condensed VCIMUII UI me UISLUS5>K;I; oeen placed 
side-D) -side with the instructions in order for eacv i*omr'4ric^n TW^ * . x trson is 
attached in Addenda A. 
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clarifies what makes it illegal for a doctor to possess controlled substances (Id. at 5).3 
Ultimately, the trial court notes, but overrules, Mr. Skordas' objection (Id.) 
While it may take a moment to actually compare the discussion to the jury 
instructions, it becomes clear through the context of the discussion that Mr. Skordas 
objected to the instruction now at issue, that discussion was held, and that the request to 
delete the inappropriate language was overruled. Importantly, although the discussion and 
objections could have been clearer had the instructions been numbered, there is simply no 
basis to assert that counsel "invited error" by commenting to the court, before having a 
written copy to study, that he "thinks" the instruction may be all right, when in the next 
instance, trial counsel asks for a time to formally pose objections. This Court should 
therefore wholly reject the State's "invited error" claim, and consider the true issues 
surrounding the improper instructions. 
B, The State Improperly Disregards The Prejudicial Effects Of The 
Erroneous Instructions. 
Because of the improper instructions, the trial court erred and Penn was highly 
prejudiced in the numerous ways set forth in Penn's opening brief. See Brief of Appellant 
at 20-27.4 
3Indeed, if one looks at the last sentence of every other instruction read to the jury, 
no last sentence is questionable but that of Instruction No. 6. 
4If this Court finds that Mr. Skordas did not appropriately object, this Court should 
proceed with a "plain error" analysis. To establish plain error, a party must show the 
following: (1) an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; 
and (3) the error was harmful, or in other words, absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the complaining party. See State v. Reyes, 861 
4 
First, as argued in the opening brief, the error should have been obvious to the trial 
I n' ill IKI (In a i uucwus instruction completely misstates the law and. equated a possible 
misdemeanor record-kerpinp offnisv In lln li Im \ \ ml,ii m nil (intssesMuin til n umliulled 
substance. See Brief of Appellant at 19-22. 
Importantly, Penn was significantly prejudiced by this error. Hiding behind an 
.:: . . however, tuc :>ia;e has completely failed to deal 
vviih the abundair —v h:* - t!- .
 t -.. r s „n 
completely misstat kiiients of "unlawful possession ?' pw -•* -juidance as 1o the 
required elements of the newly created "record keeping" felony, and directed the jury to 
. ,.:i,-i„i;... in ., *^over. the Suite onrhc r 
aside ihe reality thai Penn vvd& cuir + ' 
apprized of such theory during a preliminary hearing. And most offensive is the fact that 
the State completely disregards the idea that because the jury's attention was subverted 
liiioiiii li Inn dniintiK (if ,1 i mi1,inn m i possession case,, the jury' s verdict of guilt, at 
least on the Demerol and Hydrocodone co in mi; v r in mi uiipmieii u\ sulTn icni n wuiu 
and warrants reversal. 
"I Ins Court, therefore, she hat the State has failed to do-address these 
issues. In doing s»> MM. I i>mi »- In m li I uriiinK Hie i iptn i I |l|i n »neous instructions and 
find tha> there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. 
P.2d 1055, 105? (Utah App. 1993Moiling cases) H:ic A\ hire • 
II. THE INVALID ANTICIPATORY WARRANT MAY NOT BE 
REWRITTEN BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THE STATE. 
A. The Warrant Was Not Supported By Probable Cause. 
A threshold defect the State fails to address is the simple fact that the anticipatory 
warrant, on its face, was not supported by probable cause. See Brief of Appellant at 28-
30. This is not a question of what happened at execution. This is a question regarding 
what is contained in the affidavit at the time it is presented to the magistrate. 
While the State fails to address this question regarding probable cause at the time 
of the issuance of the warrant, in response to another issue, the State does suggest that 
"there was no event other than defendant's acceptance of the offered mushrooms 
that could or would establish probable cause." Brief of Appellee at 26 (emphasis 
added). Accepting the truth of that statement, it becomes apparent that the warrant lacks 
probable cause on its face since neither the warrant nor the supporting affidavit ever 
explicitly requires acceptance-that which the State contends is the only event which 
establishes probable cause. Instead, the information before the magistrate shows only that 
the agent or the informant would offer the mushrooms to Penn, and this warrant, 
therefore, authorized a search regardless of how Penn responded. 
To further illustrate this facial lack of probable cause, this Court should compare 
those facts generally held sufficient to establish probable cause in a traditional warrant to 
the information provided in this case. In doing so, the language in this anticipatory 
warrant is converted from future to past tense, as would be contained in a traditional non-
6 
anticipatory warrant. After doing so, it becomes clear that a magistrate would be required 
to reject a warrant if the affidavit merely stated that an informant had gone into a 
residence, offered controlled substances to an occupant, and then was searched 
afterwards. As the State seems to concede, there would be and could be no probable cause 
on such minute facts. Unless it is known, and stated, that drugs were received or accepted 
by the occupant of the home, there is simply no basis to conclude that controlled 
substances would be found. 
The concept is no different with this anticipatory warrant. The affidavit failed to 
establish probable cause, and as with all warrants, the government cannot rewrite the 
affidavit after the fact. 
B. The Anticipatory Warrant Is Invalid Despite Attempts To 
Rewrite The Triggering Events. 
With regard to the many issues surrounding the anticipatory search warrant, the 
State first asserts that an appropriate reading of the affidavit requires that acceptance of 
the mushrooms was the sole triggering event, see Brief of Appellee at 22-21 \ and that re-
searching LaPlante, the undercover agent, and their vehicle were not necessary pre-
requisites to the search of the Penn residence, see id. at 29-30. In so arguing, the State 
urges this Court to adopt what they characterize as a "common sense" reading of the 
warrant. See Brief of Appellee at 22-21. This reasoning, however, has absolutely nothing 
to do with common sense but is merely a request to ignore what was plainly written in the 
7 
affidavit and to speculate as to what the parties really meant at the time it was drafted. It 
is the very approach adopted by the trial court,5 and is deficient in two respects. 
First, the warrant expressly designates the re-searching of the informant, the 
undercover agent and the informant's vehicle as requisite triggering events. In this case 
the search warrant was executed before all required triggering events occurred. 
Second, if it is necessary to rewrite the affidavit and warrant after the fact and 
speculate as to what was meant, it becomes obvious that the conditions controlling the 
execution were not explicit, clear and narrowly drawn, so as to avoid misunderstanding or 
manipulation by government agents. See, e.g., State v. Womack, 961 P.2d 536, 544; 
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 353 F.3d 1325, 1331 (10th Cir. 2003). As such, the 
warrant is invalid for this reason as well. 
1. The Warrant Is Per Se Invalid Because The Expressed 
Triggering Events Never Occurred. 
As noted in previous briefing, Paragraph 6 of the affidavit is entitled "Anticipatory 
Information" and purportedly sets forth the facts that will occur prior to any search. Of 
special relevance, the paragraph specifically states: 
ANTICIPATORY INFORMATION.... It is anticipated that CI and UC 
will offer Penn and/or Drew the mushrooms for sale for either cash and/or 
controlled substance prescriptions. After CI and UC leave the residence, 
CI and UC and CPs vehicle will be re-searched. 
5See R. 481, U U 1-2 ("even though the affidavit failed to recite [it,] [t]he magi-
strate clearly intended that acceptance of the offer would be the trigger for execution. . . 
Even though the affiant said that the confidential informant and her car would be 
searched. . .this Court is confident that the magistrate would not have conditioned the 
warrant's validity on the search having previously occurred"). 
8 
R. 66 (emphasis added). 
Despite black letter law to the contrary,6 the State argues that the validity of the 
warrant is not contingent upon the occurrence of the expressed triggering events. Instead, 
while conceding that acceptance of the mushrooms was not expressed in the affidavit, 
the State wishes to rewrite the document and add what is missing. This Court must reject 
this invitation to analyze the warrant based upon a hindsight determination of what the 
parties may have meant rather than what they specified. 
Further, the State seeks to uphold the warrant on the occurrence of less than all 
necessary and explicit conditions. The State reasons: 
Although the warrant can arguably be read to require that [the C.I.], the 
undercover DEA agent and their vehicle be re-searched prior to the 
warrant's execution, that requirement added nothing to the probable cause 
established once police heard defendant accept the mushrooms... Thus, 
even if the affidavit is reasonably read to require that the "re-search" 
occur prior to the warrant's execution, that requirement is effectively 
obviated.. .by defendant's recorded acceptance of the mushrooms. 
See Brief of Appellee at 30 (emphasis added). 
Contrary to this position, the requirement to re-search was not only explicit in the 
anticipatory information, but failure to abide by the condition voids the warrant. The 
State's novel approach of picking and choosing which conditions it will follow is 
6It is black-letter law that probable cause supporting an anticipatory warrant is 
conditioned upon the occurrence of expected triggering events. See Womack, 967 P.2d at 
543. It is black-letter law that the warrant or supporting affidavit must clearly set out 
conditions precedent to the warrant's execution. See id; Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 
at 1331. And, it is black-letter law that an anticipatory warrant is invalid if the triggering 
event does not arise. See Womack, 967 P.2d at 543. 
9 
unsupported by any authority and is directly contrary to the policy behind anticipatory 
warrants. Indeed, 
The articulation of the triggering event serves two important purposes. First, 
it ensures that the warrant will not be executed prematurely, before there is 
probable cause. Second, and more importantly, it maintains judicial control 
over the probable cause determination and over the circumstances of the 
warrant's execution. 
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d at 1331. 
Importantly, 
If the triggering event were articulated in terms of an exercise of the 
officer's unfettered discretionary judgment-for example, "when events 
occur that establish probable cause"-this would transfer control over 
probable cause determinations from the magistrate to the law enforcement 
officer, and thus undermine the purpose of the warrant requirement. 
Accordingly, an anticipatory warrant is valid only if "the conditions 
precedent to execution are clearly set forth in the warrant or in the affidavit 
in support." 
Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d at 1331 (citing cases). 
As noted above, the State argues that it was unnecessary for officers to comply 
with the express requirements of the warrant because those requirements "added nothing 
to the probable cause established once police overheard defendant accept the mush-
rooms." Stated alternatively, the State asserts that law enforcement does not need to 
follow "the script" unique to anticipatory warrants once probable cause is established in 
the officer's mind. Such a policy undermines the very purpose of the warrant requirement 
10 
as probable cause determinations will be effectively transferred from the magistrate to 
individual law enforcement officers.7 
Anticipatory warrants are a controversial extension of the tools provided to law 
enforcement. Some jurisdictions have found them violative of state statutes and 
constitutions. See Womack, 967 P.2d at 542 (noting jurisdictions finding anticipatory 
warrants both valid and invalid under state law); 2 Wayne H. Lafave, Search and Seizure 
§ 3.7(c), at 364-365, n. 95, n.101 (noting cases). Without exception, however, every 
jurisdiction authorizing anticipatory warrants, including Utah, requires both that the 
triggering events be explicit, clear and narrowly drawn, and that the warrant is invalid if 
the expressed events do not occur.8 See Womack, 967 P.2d at 543. The purpose of both 
requirements is to insure that the magistrate, and not a police officer, determines the 
existence of probable cause. Adoption of the State's position will effectively eliminate the 
warrant requirement. 
2. The State's Position Leads To The Conclusion That The 
Warrant Is Invalid Since The Triggering Events Were Not 
Explicit, Clear and Narrowly Drawn. 
While it is Penn's position that the triggering events are explicit-i.e. the offer of 
mushrooms followed by the re-search of the participants-the State opts to ignore what is 
7Since the State argues that law enforcement does not need to follow the conditions 
set forth in the warrant and can search based on their own probable cause belief, under the 
State's theory, it would be permissible for a magistrate to issue open-ended warrants 
authorizing execution upon the officers' determination as to when probable cause exists. 
8Indeed, the warrant in this case states: "This search warrant is valid only upon the 
occurrence of the events described in the affidavit for this anticipatory search warrant." 
11 
expressed in the warrant and urges the adoption of "acceptance" as a default triggering 
event. See Brief of Appellee at 26 (reasoning that acceptance of the mushrooms was the 
only viable triggering event).9 While this approach attempts to solve one problem, it 
creates another as the newly implied triggering event is not explicit, clear and narrowly 
drawn within the affidavit or warrant. 
Undisputably, the triggering event offered by the State was never written and was 
implied by the State and the trial court long after the search was executed. The State also 
concedes that the affidavit "could have been more artfully drafted," and that the default 
triggering event of acceptance is "not expressly stated" therein. By definition, something 
not expressed can never be "explicit, clear and narrowly drawn." Consequently, where the 
rule of law and constitutionality require a magistrate to clearly and narrowly write the 
script for law enforcement to follow precisely, additions after the fact are absolutely 
9This case poses a situation distinct from those cases such as United States v. 
Hernandez-Rodriguez, and the majority of other "anticipatory warrant" cases where a 
package containing contraband is being mailed to a suspect or delivered through a postal 
system. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325 (10th Cir. 2003). 
In such situations, courts reason that the "delivery" to the residence is a sufficient trigger, 
rather than acceptance, since the contraband was on a "sure course" to the destination and 
justified a search of that destination. See id, at 1331-1332. See also 2 Wayne H. Lafave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), at 362-363, 369 (noting that most common use of anticipa-
tory warrants deal with mail delivery and noting cases requiring "sure and irreversible 
course"). In this case, there was no "sure course" without the requirement of acceptance, 
since a mere offer to Penn did not guarantee that the contraband would be present when 
the residence was searched. 
12 
impermissible.10 This Court must therefore reject the State's theory, invalidate this 
warrant, and suppress all evidence gathered as a result. 
C. Absent Information Illegally Obtained, The Search of The 
Residence Is Not Supported By Probable Cause. 
The State seemingly concedes that information obtained by LaPlante during her 
illegal search should have been excised from the affidavit. See Brief of Appellee at 27-29 
(rather than arguing validity of LaPlante's search, asserting affidavit supported by 
probable cause). The State maintains, however, that even absent such information, 
sufficient detail remains to support the search of Penn's residence based on allegations of 
impropriety at Penn's clinic. See id. The State errs. 
A search warrant affidavit must establish a nexus between the area to be searched 
and the contraband for which probable cause is established. See, e.g., United States v. 
Noland, 199 F.3d 1180, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 
1201 (10th Cir. 1998). "Probable cause to search a person's residence does not arise based 
solely upon probable cause that the person is guilty of a crime." Noland, 199 F.3d at 1183 
(emphasis added). "Instead, there must be additional evidence linking the person's home 
10By letter dated March 5, 2004, the State submitted the "supplemental authority" 
of State v, Maestas, 815 P.2d 1319, 1324 (Utah App. 1991) for the proposition that 
"[although, the sentence in question could have been clearer about the intended message, 
the trial court's interpretation of the affidavit was not unreasonable." Maestas, however, 
is irrelevant to the issues in this case. Not only was Maestas dealing with completely 
different Franks issues, but the case did not deal with an anticipatory warrant which has 
very clear, and separate rules, including the requirement for clear and explicit conditions 
precedent to execution. 
13 
to the suspected criminal activity." Id. See also, Rowland, 145 F.3d at 1204, 1206 (citing 
cases invalidating anticipatory warrants were no sufficient nexus to residence ). 
Here, absent the illegally obtained information, there is absolutely no nexus linking 
the Penn residence to any possible illegal activity concerning the prescription medi-
cations. What remains in the affidavit is stale information suggesting that questionable 
practices may have taken place at the clinic.11 But, there is nothing in the affidavit to link 
any of this alleged activity to Penn's residence, and as such, the search of the home was 
improper and unconstitutional. 
D. The Search of Penn's Residence Cannot Be Saved By Claims of 
Probable Cause And Exigent Circumstances. 
Finally, the State attempts to save the search and argues that even if this Court hold 
that the warrant is invalid, the search of the residence was permissibly based on probable 
cause and exigent circumstances. See Brief of Appellee at 33-34. This argument was 
never raised by the State in the trial court, the State does not argue plain error or 
exceptional circumstances, and consequently, this Court should refuse to address this 
claim raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 2002 UT App. 
317,114, cert, granted, 65 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2003) (barring City's justification for entry 
into residence where City failed to raise issue in trial court); State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 
1
 indeed, while information in the affidavit suggests that questionable prescribing 
practices may have been taking place at the clinic, that narcotics were left out on shelves 
at the clinic, that pharmacies sometimes complained about the clinic, and that 
medications at the clinic was allegedly missing, nothing in the affidavit linked this 
questionable activity to the Penn residence. 
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145,149-151 (Utah App.1997) (declining to address State's justification of search 
incident to arrest, probable cause and exigency that was raised for first time on appeal). 
Moreover, invoking the theory of probable cause and exigency cannot save this 
otherwise illegal search. It is well-established that an individual residence is afforded 
special constitutional protection since "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against 
which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 
573, 585 (1980). See also, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984). Admittedly, a 
"warrantless search" of a residence is permissible where probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are proven. See State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997). But, 
"when a private residence is involved, the State's burden in proving probable cause and 
exigent circumstances is 'particularly heavy.'" Id. (citation omitted). See also, State v. 
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah App. 1993).12 
Because protection of the home is so fundamental, when claiming exigent 
circumstances, "the need for an immediate search must be apparent to the police, and so 
12
"Exigent circumstances are those that would cause a reasonable person to believe 
that entry. . .was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the 
destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence 
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18. 
Exigency is based on the totality of the circumstances, and "does not evolve from one 
individual fact." City ofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1388, 1392 (Utah App 1994) 
Among factors to consider include: the distance to the nearest magistrate; the availability 
of a telephonic warrant; the feasability of a stake-out while a warrant is being obtained; 
the seriousness of the offense; the ongoing and continuing nature of the investigation; the 
extent of probable cause; and the conduct of the investigating officers. See id. at 1392. 
Notably, in "planned arrest" situations, it is highly difficult to meet the exigency prong. 
See id. at 1391. 
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strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual rights provided by the 
warrant requirement." State v. South, 885 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah App. 1994), rev 'd on other 
grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). Moreover, just because there may 
exist probable cause that controlled substances are involved, an automatic exigent 
circumstance based on destruction of evidence does not arise. See South, 885 P.2d at 800. 
This is so, because "unlike an automobile, a home cannot simply be driven away with its 
contents which may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained." Id, (internal 
quotations omitted). "Rather, the home will still be there when officers return with a 
search warrant" and furthermore, "officers can secure a home while a search warrant is 
obtained." Id. "Therefore, the mere fact that a controlled substance may be removed, 
hidden, or destroyed is not, in and of itself, an exigent circumstance." Id. "To so hold 
would essentially undermine the exigent circumstance requirement [as] most forms of 
evidence can be destroyed . . . " Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
In the present case, the State contends that officers had probable cause to search 
the entire residence once Penn accepted the mushrooms. See Brief of Appellee at 33. The 
obvious problem is that rather than arresting Penn for a crime committed in their 
presence, the agents left the residence. Thus, while a search for $80 worth of mushrooms 
may have been appropriate incident to an arrest made contemporaneous with the 
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acceptance of the contraband, once the officer left, there was no basis for a warrantless 
entry or search of the home.13 
Further, probable cause was still lacking to justify a search for any evidence 
beyond the mushrooms. Recognizing this, the State attempts to justify the search for the 
prescription narcotics adding the "police knew defendant had been fired from the hospital 
for using drugs/'14 Such assertion is unavailing, provides no nexus that narcotics would 
be found at the residence, and even if there was some accuracy, such information was 
stale. 
Next, as their requisite exigent circumstance, the State offers the conclusory claim 
that the substances could be hidden, removed, or destroyed. As noted above, however, the 
law requires more. See South, 885 P.2d at 800. In this case, there is absolutely no 
evidence in the record establishing an exigent circumstance that would justify a search 
absent a valid warrant. No facts show that Penn knew he was being investigated, that he 
was likely to quickly dispose of the mushrooms, or that he posed any risk or danger to 
13Even a constitutionally permissible "search incident to arrest" would not have 
uncovered the demerol and hydrocodone found in the back of the refrigerator and a 
bathroom medicine cabinet, well out of Penn's reach, and in areas where no weapons 
were likely hidden. See, e.g., State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 979 (Utah App. 1998) 
(citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) and noting that search of area 
reasonably within arrestee's immediate control is permissible incident to arrest, but there 
is no justification "for routinely searching any room other than that in which arrest 
occurs-or, for that matter, for searching through all desk drawers or other closed or 
concealed areas"). 
l4Because this issue was never raised below the record is incomplete. In reality, Dr. 
Penn was not fired from the hospital, he resigned, and his leaving had nothing to do with 
any allegation regarding controlled substances (R. 507 at 71-72, 115-118). 
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anyone. Officers could have easily continued to watch the home in order to obtain a valid 
warrant. 
Nor is there any justifiable reason or exigent circumstance to search the entire 
house for the demorol and hydrocodone. On this point, any claim that destruction of 
evidence posed an exigent circumstance is simply unavailing since the confidential 
informant reported the whereabouts of these substances weeks prior to the search. If the 
exigency did not exist weeks previously, then it cannot be said to exist at the time of the 
invalid search. 
IV. RELIEF FROM THIS COURT IS WARRANTED WHERE THE 
STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL INFORMATION. 
A. A Constitutional And Statutory Violation Has Been Established. 
The State claims that "the defendant did not establish that the state failed to 
disclose material information, about Lisa's cooperation." Brief of Appellee at 34. 
Unfortunately, the State fails to support this position and make any showing to the 
contrary. Focusing instead on what was or was not marshaled,15 the State simply does not 
address the true issue. 
15The State alleges a failure to marshal by not mentioning trial counsel's opening 
statement, cross-examination of LaPlante, or closing argument which "demonstrate 
counsel's strategic use of evidence of the disposition." Brief of Appellee at 37. The State 
misses the issue. Penn has never alleged that the disposition of Gene LaPlante's case was 
unknown. In fact, Penn clearly states that trial counsel was aware of the disposition. See 
Brief of Appellant at 41. However, the actual deal made between Lisa LaPlante and the 
County Attorney was never disclosed. This is the issue the State fails to recognize-an 
issue appropriately briefed and one that remains uncontroverted. 
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The uncontroverted and marshaled facts establish that the State entered into a 
"deal" with their most important witness at trial. The "deal" was not based on a mere 
hope or expectation on the part of the witness, but was an express agreement that the 
State would make the aggravated assault charges of her husband "go away" in exchange 
for assistance. Most importantly, the unchallenged record establishes that the existence of 
the deal was never revealed to the defendant.16 
It is well established that "[w]hen the 'reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence,' non disclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls 
within th[e] general rule of Brady." Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). 
Thus, while there may be a basis for disagreement in regards to the prejudice 
associated with these violations, the record before this Court clearly establishes that 
the State failed in its statutory and constitutional obligations.17 
16Mr. Skordas submitted an affidavit establishing that he was never made aware of 
the deal (R. 398-400). Although the State argues that the trial court implicitly rejected 
trial counsel's affidavit, the State offers no support for that conclusion. Further, if the 
State contested the assertions in the affidavit, they had ample opportunity to present 
further affidavit or testimony from Mr. Benge, the trial attorney for the State. 
17The existence of the deal was not the only violation. The State also failed to 
disclose that at the relevant time period, LaPlante's husband was being investigated for 
other crimes (R. 505 at 19-26, 28-31), and failed to provide additional investigative 
interviews of witnesses Angie Stoughton, Marie Packard, and pharmacist Mike Goyne, 
one of which testified at trial. All were noted during the motion for new trial and have 
been preserved (R. 351 (noting that reports of interviews with Angie Stoughton, Marie 
Packard, and pharmacist Mike Goyne, have not been provided); R. 505 at 47-50; R.425-
426). The reports were finally provided for the first time after the hearing on the motion 
for a new trial (R. 505 at 50-52; R. 456-471). Such information was critical to the 
defendant's investigation of the case and takes another bite from the fairness of this trial. 
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B. The Defendant Was Prejudiced By The Discovery Violation And 
A New Trial Is Required. 
A new trial based on the prosecution's failure to disclose material evidence is 
appropriate when a defendant's substantial rights have been affected. See Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). Prejudice occurs when the failure to disclose 
affects basic fundamental rights-such as the right to a fair trial. See United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Here, both 
the failure to reveal the existence of the deal as well as the State's untruthful argument to 
the jury of the witness's motivation for testifying was prejudicial and limited not only trial 
counsel's ability to fully investigate and cross examine, but also limited the jury's ability 
to fully consider the credibility of the key witness. 
The State defends, however, that trial counsel adequately cross-examined 
LaPlante, and in doing so, both Penn and the jury was informed of the disposition of her 
husband's charges.18 The State further notes that the jury was made aware of LaPlante's 
anger toward Penn and was instructed that they could consider bias and motive of a 
witness in considering the case. See Brief of Appellee at 34-35. Thus, the State reasons 
that because Penn's trial counsel knew of the disposition of Gene LaPlante's charges, the 
State had no obligation to reveal the actual deal. See id. at 36-37. Such logic in no way 
excuses the State's failure of its duty, and the true question is not whether the knowledge 
18The State attempts to avoid accountability for its discovery violation and make 
this issue a simple question of ineffective assistance. See Brief of Appellee at 38-39; R. 
505 at 16-17. Make no mistake, this issue revolves around both an absolute violation of 
the State's duty, as well as an ineffective assistance claim. 
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of the disposition obviates the discovery violation, rather it is whether the established 
violation was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. 
In reality, while Penn's counsel presented argument and elicited facts hoping that 
the jury would infer the existence of a deal, trial counsel could go no further because he 
had been deliberately kept in the dark by the State. Several cases guide why this scenario 
is prejudicial to the defendant and requires reversal. For example, in People v. Savvides, 1 
N.Y.2d 554 (N.Y.App.1956), cited favorably in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-270 
(1959), the defendant was convicted based on testimony of a witness who had made an 
undisclosed deal with the State. See Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d at 554. Reversing the conviction, 
the appellate court noted the inherent danger and unreliability of such testimony. 
Where a promise of leniency or other consideration is held out to a self-
confessed criminal for his co-operation, there is grave danger that, if he be 
weak or unscrupulous, he will not hesitate to incriminate others to further 
his own self-interest. Long experience in granting leniency to "co-
operative" accomplices has undoubtedly shown the hazards in the 
practice... It requires no extended discussion, however, to establish 
that the existence of such a promise might be a strong factor in the 
minds of the jurors in assessing the witness' credibility and in 
evaluating the worth of his testimony. The failure to disclose an 
"understanding" or a promise cannot but seriously impair the jury's 
ability to pass upon this vital issue. 
Id. at 557 (emphasis added). 
As in this case, neither the Savvides defendant nor the jury were notified of the 
actual deal made between the cooperating witness and the government. Also as in this 
case, defense counsel elicited testimony at trial inferring that a deal had been made. 
Notably, the Savvides court rejected the same argument now posed by the State-that an 
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inference of a deal is sufficient to remedy the prosecution's failure to disclose. The court 
rightfully explained "that [an inference] is a far cry from positive knowledge that [the 
witness] had actually been assured consideration in return for continued co-operation and 
that he had deliberately lied about the matter on the stand." Id. at 558. 
The United States Supreme Court also recognizes the prejudicial effects of non-
disclosure of deals made for witness testimony. See, e.g., Napue, 360 U.S. at 270 ("we do 
not believe that the fact that the jury was apprized of other grounds for believing that the 
witness.. .may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner turned what was other-
wise a tainted trial into a fair one.. .Had the jury been apprized of the true facts.. .it 
might well have concluded that [the witness] had fabricated testimony in order to curry 
the favor of the very representative of the State who was prosecuting the case in which 
[the witness] was testifying"); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151-155 (reversal required for non-
disclosed promise of leniency made to key witness despite vigorous cross-examination 
seeking to reveal possible agreements). 
All of these cases support the proposition that the State must disclose deals it has 
made to material witnesses and must not allow false testimony or information to be 
presented to the jury. The prosecution in this case failed in both respects. Not only did the 
State fail to disclose the deal, the prosecution affirmatively argued to the jury that Lisa 
LaPlante was the one who "contacted the city police" because of her "concerns" based 
upon observations made as an employee at Penn's medical clinic (R. 506 at 46). Because 
22 
the true story had not been revealed, the prosecutor's version of events went 
unchallenged, leaving the jury with a false impression regarding critical facts. 
Only subsequent to the trial was it learned that during a conversation with police 
regarding her husband's criminal case, that a police officer first proposed to LaPlante 
that if she would be willing to provide information regarding Penn, it might help her 
husband's case (R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 32-34). In a subsequent meeting at the Grand County 
Attorney's office, an agreement was reached wherein the State agreed to make Gene 
LaPlante's case "go away" in exchange for Lisa LaPlante's assistance against Penn (R. 
502, Exhibit 5 at 36). Importantly, when explaining after trial the sequence of events and 
why she only came forward when the offer was made regarding her husband's charges, 
LaPlante admitted that up to that point, she believed [Penn] was "fundamentally a good 
doctor" but things had "changed in an instant" (R. 502, Exhibit 5 at 118-120). 
Undisputably, the State never disclosed the actual agreement or the facts regarding 
how it came into existence. More outrageous, the State then had the audacity to 
affirmatively and untruthfully argue to the jury that LaPlante came forward out of an 
altruistic concern for society. Such actions undermined the fairness of the trial, tainted the 
jury, and this Court must remedy the situation. 
V. IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL "BAD ACTS" EVIDENCE WAS 
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED. 
Several instances of irrelevant and prejudicial "bad acts" evidence was improperly 
admitted after being brought to the attention of the trial court and after objection by trial 
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counsel. Further, if this Court finds that counsel's objections were not specific enough, 
this Court may still find plain error. 
Trial counsel filed a motion in limine regarding objections to anticipated testimony 
of LaPlante and her alleged observations of Penn in his medical practice. (R. 139-141). 
This motion put the trial court on notice that LaPlante had made several statements to 
officers regarding alleged interactions and observations of Penn and his conduct at work, 
including questionable prescribing practices. In the motion, such statements and instances 
of alleged "bad acts" were objected to on relevancy grounds pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Evidence 402, and although not specified as a Rule 403 objection, were also argued to be 
unduly prejudicial (See id.). This motion was specific enough to put the court on notice of 
potential relevancy and prejudicial issues concerning anticipated allegations of Penn's 
prior acts, was specific enough to cover all the instances of prejudicial testimony set forth 
in the Brief of Appellant, and at the very least, the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing such evidence without "scrupulous examination" after being notified that such 
issues would arise during trial. 
Beyond the motion in limine, numerous instances of prejudicial and irrelevant 
instances of bad acts were admitted over the objection of counsel.19 As such, and for 
19Specifically, testimony was elicited over objection that: Penn attempted to 
commit suicide (R. 506 at 64); LaPlante found Penn one time in a room of the clinic 
sleeping, with a tourniquet-like object and bent needles on floor (Id. at 65); and at times 
Penn acted weird all day, would walk into walls, and would dictate but not recall what he 
was talking about or the patients he had seen (Id.). This specific testimony came about in 
response to State questions asking whether during "the winter of 2001 and going into 
2002, did [LaPlante] notice any aberrant behavior of Dr. Penn?" (Id.). In response, 
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the reasons set forth in previous briefing, these irrelevant and prejudicial allegations were 
not scrupulously analyzed by the trial judge, should not have been allowed, and 
prejudiced Penn. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing as well as the argument, points, and issues raised in the 
Brief of Appellant, Appellant Penn urges this Court to find that numerous reversible 
errors were made in this case that prejudiced the outcome of this trial. As such, this Court 
should reverse Penn's conviction on Counts II and III, due to insufficient evidence, and 
remand the remainder of the case for a new trial. 
DATED this I/' day of March 2004. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
AT)fN MARIE TALIAFERRO 
torneys for Appellant Penn 
LaPlante began that Penn had attempted suicide and Mr. Skordas objected. The 
prosecution answered that the testimony was relevant to show what behavior led the 
witness to believe Penn was using controlled substances. The trial court overruled the 
objection and allowed the line of questioning, stating "let's keep rolling."(7d. at 64-65). 
After the objection was overruled, LaPlante continued explaining observations of alleged 
aberrant behavior detailing the tourniquet observation and statements that Penn 
sometimes "acted weird." 
Specific testimony was also elicited that Penn and Drew used mushrooms on a 
previous occasion {Id. at 65-66). This questioning was objected to on hearsay and 
relevancy grounds {Id. at 65). The testimony was allowed to establish the basis for why 
the matter was brought to the attention of the DEA {Id. at 65-66). 
Finally, abundant testimony was allowed alleging that Penn engaged in illegal 
prescription practices {Id. at 149). All of this was objected to as set forth in the pre-trial 
motion in limine. 
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THE COURT I'll aaKt that chftaqt. 
MR SKORDAS -- I would ask the Court to 
strike the very last sentence 
THE COURT Why' 
MR SKORDAS Nell, because the law, I think 
what the CoUrc'i attempted to do is to restate the 
statute, and the statute speaks for itself 
THE COURT So you want ate to give the statute 
to the jury to read? 
MR SKORDAS No, no I want you to quit at 
the end of the statute, which is what you would have 
done had you not added that last sentence That sort of 
is the statute You paraphrased it, but I think in a 
way that makes sense logically to the jurors and that 
would be my only request with respect to that 
instruction 
MR BBWGE I guess I would ask that it 
remain I think in the rest of the course of the 
instructions it txplams things in the alternative If 
you find this, you find that, if you don't find this, 
you find that I think that that shows both sides of 
the issue 
THE COURT I put it in to link up the illegal 
language in the elements instruction with something that 
CitiCourt, LLC 

























P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT P l e a s e b e s e a t e d 
Counsel, have you s«en the instructions I 
propose to gxve? 
MR SKORDAS Yes, your Honor 
MR BEN6E Yes, your Honor 
THE COURT Any exceptions, any problems? 
MR BENGE No exceptions 
THE COURT Mr Skordas* 
MR SKORDAS A couple, your Honor 
They're not numbered, but there are a few, so 
I submitted some proposed jury instructions, and I 
assumed that those are part of the Court's records 
THE COURT I have them 
MR SKORDAS There's a jury instruction that 
begins, your Honor, it's about number seven or eight, 
hydrocodone and meperidine are controlled substances 
it's a very short instruction 
THE COURT Uh-huh 
MR SKORDAS And may be legally prescribed 
I would only ask that that be amended to say may be 
legally prescribed and legally possessed The next 
sentence talks about legally prescribed and legally 
possessed and I would ask the Court to make that 


























defines that In order to prevent the jury from saying, 
well, okay, he's supposed to do that He's permitted to 
do that If he doesn't do it is it illegal' I think 
it's obvious, but I've had enough jurors ask me 
questions like that, that I felt I better state the 
obvious so they can watch that if they find this on your 
exception That is noted but overruled I think it's 
important to (inaudible) 
MR SKORDAS The next instruction 
(inaudible) 
THE COURT You want me to give that one' 
That was sort of iffy whet her you want me to or not I 
won't give that if you don't want me to, Mr Skordas 
but I think it helps your client more than it 
(inaudible) 
MR SKORDAS I was bothered by it until I 
read it enough times, and I agree (Inaudible) I 
guess I'm a skeptic when ] see things 
There's an instruction about five later that 
begins, although a person It's a three-paragraph 
instruction 
THE COURT That's the nonexclusive 
MR SKORDAS Correct I would simply ask the 
Court to strike the final paragraph in its entirety 
THE COURT Oka> 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
No. 0217-103. 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
TO THE JURY 
MEMBERS OP THE JURY: 
The defendant, NATHANIEL FREDERICK PENN, is accused by 
an Information filed in this Court by the County Attorney of 
Brand County, State of Utah, of having committed the following 
crimes: 
MLAKFOL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE . 
SONS, in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
is .amended, in that the said defendant, on or about April 20, 
002, at Grand County* State of Utah, did knowingly and 
ntentionally possess a controlled substance, i.e., psilocin, in 
drug free zone. 
OUHT 2: 
HLAWFDL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE 
3NE, in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
> amended, in that the said defendant, on or about April 20, 
)02, at Grand County, State of Utah, did knowingly and 
ttentionally possess a controlled substance, i.e., hydrocodone, 
DUHT 3: 
NLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN A DRUG FREE 
ONE, in violation of Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
B amended, in that the said defendant, on or about April 20, 
002, at Grand County, State of Utah, did knowingly and 
ntentionally possess a controlled substance, i.e., demerol, 
Lthout a valid prescription or order, in a drug free zone. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 -
It is my duty to instruct you about the law applicable to this 
le and your duty to follow that law in deciding what happened and 
sther the defendant is guilty. You must base your decision on 
i evidence introduced at this trial. 
Do not allow sympathy for the defendant or respect for the 
aecutor to influence your decision. The charge itself is no 
dence of guilt. You should not be affected by emotion, 
judice or speculation. Do not worry about the result of your 
diet. 
You must conscientiously and dispassionately consider the 
INSTRUCTION NO. *? 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements 
are as follows: 
COUNT I: POSSESSION OP PSILOCHN IN A DRUG FREE ZONE 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant possessed psilocin, 
3. In a drug free zone, and 
4. Knowing what it was and intending to possess it. 
COUNT II: IMBQAIi POSSESSION, OF nmPCPPONg IN ft DRUG FRKg 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2.^ Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed 
hydrocodone, 
3. In a drug free zone, 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with 
the law 
COUNT III: TTJffflftl. POSSESSION OF PBffiROL IM ft DRUG FREE ZQNB 
1. That on or about April 20, 2002, 
2. Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed 
demerol, 
3. In a drug free zone, 
4. Without a prescription or otherwise complying with 
the law 
If you believe that the state has proved each of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. * 
Drug Free Zone means at or within 1,000 feet of any 
public or private elementary or secondary school or the grounds 
of any of those schools. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ 
Hydrocodone and meperidine (or demerol) «n> controlled 
substances that may be legally prescribed and legally possessed. 
Psilocin o^hallucinogenic mushrooms may never be legally 
prescribed and cannot be legally possessed except for law 
enforcement purposes. 
INSTRUCTION NO. JO 
Phyfn,ri»n« lirpnaad to prescribe-controlled substances-wust-
still obtain a prescription for any controlled substances for 
personal use. Physician's licensed to dispense or administer 
controlled substances are also permitted to possess reasonable 
quantities of controlled substances for dispensing or 
administering to patients, but they are required to keep a record 
of controlled substances received for that purpose and dispensed 
or administered by them as physicians. A physician who fails to 
comply with this requirement possesses those substances 
illegally. 
